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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a century, the sports industry has been intellectual kryptonite 
for antitrust jurisprudence.  Although sports leagues have not been granted 
blanket antitrust immunity,1 courts have afforded them often-puzzling 
deference under the law.  The most bizarre manifestation of this deference 
was Major League Baseball’s anomalous antitrust exemption.2  Not far 
 
 1.  See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (holding that the NFL's licensing 
activities are “not categorically beyond the coverage of [antitrust laws]”). 
 2.  See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) ("With its reserve system enjoying exemption 
from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly.  
Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration confined to baseball. . . .  [T]he aberration 
is an established one . . . .  It is . . . fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis . . . ."); Toolson v. 
N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l 
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).  The current scope or existence of that exemption is still up for 
debate.  See generally Nathaniel Grow, Defining the "Business of Baseball": A Proposed Framework 
for Determining the Scope of Professional Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
557 (2010).  Courts have also afforded antitrust deference because of the unique interdependent 
nature of the teams in a league.  See e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 
1408 (9th Cir. 1984).  Given that teams need to reach agreements for the product to exist, courts 
have been willing to analyze most league restraints—even those that appear to be per se illegal in 
other industries—under the Rule of Reason.  See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 100–20 (1984); L.A. Mem’l, 726 F.2d at 1386–87 (citing Standard Oil of N.J. v. United 
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behind the much-ridiculed baseball trilogy, however, is the muddled, 
incoherent deference to the NCAA under section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 
Commentators have long derided the stubborn “myth of amateurism,” 
noting that the NCAA has morphed into a profit-seeking machine that serves 
the decidedly professional and economic function of regulating college 
sports.4  That criticism has only amplified over the last decade with the birth 
of billion dollar television deals, expanding tournament fields, and, of 
course, conference realignment. 5 
Yet the amateurism beast lives on, both in limiting the benefits afforded 
college athletes and in providing the NCAA an antitrust defense for those 
limitations.  The Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in NCAA v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma6 spawned the amateurism defense—
an anomaly in antitrust law.7  It allows the NCAA to argue that the social 
benefits of amateurism outweigh the anticompetitive effects of its 
amateurism restraints.8  Amateurism provides the NCAA with special 
treatment under the Sherman Act but gives courts no framework for 
applying the special treatment.9  With no guidance, courts have created a 
hodgepodge of standards that are divorced from the basic purpose of 
antitrust law.10 
Absent an antitrust exemption, and assuming the continuing vitality of 
 
States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911)).  Courts have also acknowledged that “competitive balance” is a 
legitimate pro-competitive benefit for purposes of balancing economic effects under the Rule of 
Reason.  See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119–20 (1984). 
 3.   See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012);  see also infra Parts II–III. 
 4.  See Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New Clothes: 
Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 496 (2008). 
 5.  See generally, e.g., Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 
2011, at 80, available at www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-
sports/308643/. 
 6.   468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 7.  See id. 
 8.   See, e.g., id at 120 (noting, inter alia, that “[t]he NCAA plays a critical role in the 
maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports” to such an extent that “[t]here 
can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or that the preservation of the 
student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is 
entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act”).  
 9.  See infra Part II. 
 10.   See infra Parts II–III. 
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the amateurism beast, the goal of this short piece is modest—to suggest the 
creation of a test that provides a coherent mechanism for setting limits on the 
ability of the NCAA to restrict competition for student-athletes.  The current 
models simply do not work.11  Among other things, they lead to ad hoc (and 
intellectually unsatisfying) partial exemptions or presumptions that restraints 
are legal merely because they contribute to amateurism.12  Rather than 
continue the charade of analyzing the social effects of amateurism under the 
traditional Rule of Reason analysis, this piece suggests that courts may be 
better off applying a nontraditional antitrust test to govern NCAA conduct.13  
Two possible solutions are Addyston Pipe’s less restrictive alternative 
inquiry14 or the globally accepted proportionality analysis.15 
 II.  THE NCAA ANTITRUST BEAST 
The genesis of the NCAA’s special treatment can be traced to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents, which invalidated NCAA 
restrictions on the broadcast of college football games.16  Board of Regents 
spawned a two-headed amateurism defense17 for the NCAA that has 
managed to survive decades of ridicule and criticism.18  This amateurism 
Orthros19 has enabled the NCAA and its member institutions to agree on a 
variety of restrictions that prevent student-athletes from receiving 
compensation or other benefits.20 
 
 11.  See infra Parts II–III.  
 12.  See infra Parts II–III. 
 13.  See infra Part IV. 
 14.  Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).  See infra Part IV. 
 15.  See infra Part IV. 
 16.  468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 17.  See Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or 
Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 338–40 (2007). 
 18.  See generally, e.g., Branch, supra note 5. 
 19.  Orthros is a two-headed dog from Greek mythology.  See Aaron J. Atsma, Kyon Orthros, 
THE THEOI PROJECT: GREEK MYTHOLOGY, www.theoi.com/Ther/KuonOrthros.html (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2013).  The two-headed amateurism defense has proved to be more durable than Orthros.  
See id. 
 20.  The Supreme Court has also recognized the promotion of “competitive balance” as a 
legitimate procompetitive benefit of restraints by the NCAA and professional sports leagues.  See 
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119–20.  Recognizing the competitive imbalance inherent in college 
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The first prong of the amateurism defense holds that the maintenance 
and promotion of amateurism and academic ideals are legitimate 
procompetitive benefits for purposes of analysis under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.21  As the Board of Regents Court explained: 
  The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered 
tradition of amateurism in college sports.  There can be no question 
but that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or that the 
preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness 
and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent 
with the goals of the Sherman Act.22 
The second prong attempts to couch amateurism as an economic 
 
sports, the NCAA has recently changed the focus of its rules away from the promotion of 
competitive balance.  Cf. Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. 
REV. 2631, 2665, 2667 (1996) (recognizing that “the totality of NCAA rules appear to do a very 
poor job of promoting . . . competitive balance” and questioning whether “any one of the NCAA’s 
rules, or even the rules as a whole, significantly enhance ‘competitive balance,’” especially in light 
of the “large disparities in playing ability and little relative movement in rankings among NCAA 
members under the status quo, and the NCAA’s seeming lack of concern over this apparent 
competitive imbalance today”).  The de-emphasis on providing a level playing field vitiates the 
competitive balance antitrust defense for the NCAA and leaves it only with its anomalous 
amateurism argument.  
 21.  See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120. 
 22.  Id.  The Court added the following: 
What the NCAA and its member institutions market in this case is competition itself—
contests between competing institutions.  Of course, this would be completely ineffective 
if there were no rules on which the competitors agreed to create and define the 
competition to be marketed.  A myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of the 
field, the number of players on a team, and the extent to which physical violence is to be 
encouraged or proscribed, all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in which 
institutions compete . . . .  And the integrity of the “product” cannot be preserved except 
by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its 
effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed.  Thus, the 
NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a 
result enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.  In 
performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice—not only the choices available 
to sports fans but also those available to athletes—and hence can be viewed as 
procompetitive.  
Id. at 101–02; see also Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (“Even in the 
increasingly commercial modern world, this Court believes there is still validity to the Athenian 
concept of a complete education derived from fostering full growth of both mind and body.”). 
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justification for NCAA restraints, holding that the NCAA’s amateurism 
restrictions are necessary for the unique product of college football to exist.23  
As the Board of Regents Court further observed: 
[T]he NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—college 
football.  The identification of this “product” with an academic 
tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more 
popular than professional sports to which it might otherwise be 
comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball.  In order 
to preserve the character and quality of the “product,” athletes must 
not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.24 
Both of these prongs fly in the face of the foundational notion of 
antitrust law that “the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will 
yield the best allocation of our economic resources.”25  The first head of the 
NCAA’s amateurism beast essentially stands for the proposition that 
antitrust law should protect amateurism for the sake of protecting 
amateurism;  that is, antitrust law should allow the NCAA to restrict student-
athlete compensation because of the social value inherent in maintaining 
their amateur (i.e., unpaid) status.26 
This justification is problematic for a number of reasons.27  Perhaps 
most significantly, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected social 
 
 23.  Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 
(1999) (“We agree with these courts that, in general, the NCAA’s eligibility rules allow for the 
survival of the product, amateur sports, and allow for an even playing field.”); see also, e.g., 
McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344–45 (5th Cir. 1988).  
 24.  468 U.S. at 101–02.  
 25.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).  For a thorough discussion of the 
shortcomings of the NCAA’s antitrust defenses, see Lazaroff, supra note 17. 
 26.  See generally Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to 
Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206 (1990) (arguing that the NCAA’s amateurism restrictions are 
illegal, are not necessary to advance any legitimate interest, and that student-athletes should, 
therefore, receive compensation). 
 27.  See, e.g., Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, College Sports, and Interleague Rulemaking: A 
New Critique of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 86 (2006) 
(“[A]uthorizing lower courts to recognize non-economic justifications opens the door to an infinite 
variety of potential arguments that will de-stabilize antitrust laws, increasing the costs to parties as 
they grapple with unclear expectations.”). 
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welfare justifications in antitrust analysis.28  In National Society of 
Professional Engineers v. United States, the defendants argued that a ban on 
competitive bidding was necessary to protect public health and safety.29  The 
Court rejected these non-economic justifications, holding that “the Rule of 
Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition 
itself is unreasonable”30 or that, “because of the special characteristics of a 
particular industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and 
commerce than competition.”31  The Court explained that the Rule of Reason 
analysis “is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions” 
and that any argument that social goals should be considered “is properly 
addressed to Congress.”32 
Moreover, this “myth of amateurism”33 ignores the fact that the NCAA 
 
 28.  See, e.g., id. at 85 (“The Supreme Court has never accepted a non-economic justification for 
anticompetitive conduct . . . .”). 
 29.  435 U.S. 679, 681 (1978).  The defendant’s theory was that competitive bidding would drive 
prices so low that the winning bidder would be forced to sacrifice quality and safety.  Id. at 684–85. 
 30.  Id. at 696. 
 31.  Id. at 689. 
 32.  Id. at 689–90.  The Court echoed this reasoning in FTC v. Indiana Federation. of Dentists, 
holding that an argument that free competition “will lead [consumers] to make unwise and even 
dangerous choices” is, in reality, “‘nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the 
Sherman Act.’”  476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695); 
see also FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) (“The social 
justifications proffered for respondents’ restraint of trade thus do not make it any less unlawful.”); 
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021–22 (10th Cir. 1998) (“While opening up coaching positions for 
younger people may have social value apart from its [e]ffect on competition, we may not consider 
such values unless they impact upon competition.”); Lee Goldman, The Politically Correct 
Corporation and the Antitrust Laws: The Proper Treatment of Noneconomic or Social Welfare 
Justifications Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 161 (1995) 
(“Competition is the talisman, and the Court will not countenance any argument premised on the 
undesirability of competition in a particular market.”).  But see Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 
773, 788–89 n.17 (1975) (“The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may 
require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act 
in another context, be treated differently.  We intimate no view on any other situation than the one 
with which we are confronted today.”); Goldman, supra, at 146–47 (“A strong argument exists that 
social welfare justifications should be permitted to offset anticompetitive effects, at least when the 
benefits from the challenged conduct are clear and the harm is relatively benign.  Competitors are 
often in the best position to identify and respond to market failures.  At a time when the political 
process appears incapable of responding to the many social problems crippling society, one may 
believe that the law should not discourage, much less penalize, socially responsible behavior by 
private parties.”). 
 33.  See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 4, at 496. 
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has become a profit-seeking enterprise that governs multi-billion dollar 
entertainment products.34  That criticism has only grown over the last decade 
with bigger tournament fields, billion-dollar television contracts, and, most 
recently, conference realignment.35  At this point, there is no question that 
the NCAA’s focus on the student-athlete is harder to stomach than it was 
thirty years ago, at least with respect to the top one percent of men’s football 
and basketball.  The amateurism-for-the-sake-of-amateurism prong therefore 
suffers from two potential flaws: it either affords too much credit to a notion 
that may be a pretextual shield for the NCAA’s economic goals, or it credits 
a defense that is irrelevant under antitrust law. 
The quasi-economic second prong of the amateurism defense—that 
college football cannot exist without amateurism—fares no better for a 
number of reasons.  First, while it is hard to argue with the conclusion that a 
college football game cannot exist without an agreement between two 
different football teams,36 there is no empirical evidence to support the 
conclusion that college football cannot exist without “amateurism” 
restrictions on its players.37  It is an open question whether the demand for 
college sports can be sustained if the student-athletes receive compensation.38  
 
 34.  See, e.g., id. at 505–20 (discussing and listing, inter alia, annual revenue for the NCAA); see 
also Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that the view of the NCAA’s eligibility rules as noncommercial was “an 
outmoded image of intercollegiate sports that no longer jibes with reality”).  
 35.  See generally, e.g., Michael A. Corgan, Comment, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept 
Endorsement Deals: A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Created by 
Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
371 (2012). 
 36.  Of course, even this conclusion is flawed.  Any college can play an intra-squad game.  A 
game between two different schools may be a more attractive product, but a “game” can exist 
without an agreement between two teams. 
 37.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable nor Necessary: 
“Amateurism” in Big-Time College Sports, 14 ANTITRUST 51, 51 (2000) (“From the point of view 
of antitrust economics, the NCAA’s claims ultimately rest on an unproven assumption: fans[’] 
preference for amateurism is a sine qua non of college sports.”). 
 38.  Cf. Alfred Dennis Mathewson, By Education or Commerce: The Legal Basis for the Federal 
Regulation of the Economic Structure of Intercollegiate Athletics, 76 UMKC L. REV. 597, 606–07 
(2008) (discussing the idea of potential student-athlete compensation in the context of antitrust law 
and explaining that “[a] competitive market could result in lower prices but the opposite has 
occurred in part because the peculiar economic structure of colleges and universities continues to 
drive demand”); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Competitive Entertainment: Implications of the NFL Lockout 
Litigation for Sports, Theatre, Music, and Video Entertainment, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
[Vol. 41: 249, 2014] Taming the NCAA Antitrust Beast 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
256 
It may be that college sports are popular because the athletes play for a 
particular school, regardless of whether that school pays them to play.39  
Commentators also point to the Olympics and other sporting competitions 
that successfully transitioned from an “amateur” to a “professional” model 
without destroying their product.40  Similarly, one can argue that the 
NCAA’s amateurism rules have not actually created a distinct product—that 
is, college sports are “professional,” they are just professional sports played 
where the athletes receive no direct compensation.41 
 The second prong also fails as a matter of law because it simply proves 
too much.  The NCAA’s argument is essentially that the product of college 
football is defined by players who are unpaid.42  Therefore, the product 
cannot exist unless colleges agree not to pay the players.  But that argument 
would allow any group of competitors to justify their restraints of trade on 
the basis that their products are defined by the result of their restrictions.  
Under that theory, the NFL could justify a hard salary cap by arguing that 
the NFL product is a game of football where team salaries are capped.  And 
a professional society of engineers could justify a ban on competitive 
bidding on the basis that their product is engineering based on quality, not 
price.  Yet, these justifications are clearly not permitted under antitrust law.43 
 
93, 120 (2012) (noting, just before a discussion about antitrust jurisprudence in the realm of college 
sports, that “[l]abor costs must be reflected in the prices for products and services, and so better 
employment terms tend to reduce demand in product markets”).   
 39.  Cf. Michael P. Acain, Comment, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of 
College Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 307 (1998) (“Year after year, fans of collegiate 
athletics flock to stadiums across the country to pay reverence to their respective athletic teams.  
These teams not only provide their supporters with a steady source of entertainment, but their 
performance also helps bring notoriety and pride to the universities they represent.”).  
 40.  Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 37, at 54 (discussing the continued popularity of the 
Olympics and tennis tournaments after their transition to a professional model). 
 41.  See, e.g., id. at 53; Matthew J. Mitten, University Price Competition for Elite Students and 
Athletes: Illusions and Realities, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 59, 77 (1995) (noting that “[i]n many ways, 
college sports, particularly high-caliber football and basketball programs, are more similar to 
professional sports than amateur sports at the high school and youth levels”). 
 42.  See Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 
459 (1999). 
 43.  In Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., the Court accepted Broadcasting Music, 
Inc.’s (BMI) argument that its blanket license created a new product, but this only allowed BMI to 
avoid per se illegality.  441 U.S. 1, 20, 22 (1979).  Ironically, critics who point to the hypocrisy of 
the schools making millions off of the students who get paid nothing are not necessarily helping the 
antitrust case against the NCAA.  The NCAA’s argument is that they are able to make millions 
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III.  ANOMALOUS TREATMENT OF THE NCAA UNDER ANTITRUST LAW 
The shaky antitrust foundation of amateurism has put lower courts in the 
impossible position of evaluating the legality of NCAA restraints based on 
concepts that are incompatible with the basic premise of antitrust law.44 
Recognition of amateurism as a legitimate procompetitive benefit asks 
courts to balance the anticompetitive economic effects of restrictions on 
student-athletes with the social benefits of amateurism to college sports. 
This type of balancing is anathema to antitrust law.45  The goal of section 1 
of the Sherman Act is to ferret out anticompetitive conduct.46  The Rule of 
Reason thus asks courts to balance the economic effects of a restraint.47  If 
the restraint is net procompetitive—that is, if its procompetitive benefits 
outweigh its anticompetitive effects—it is legal.48  If it is net 
anticompetitive—if the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive 
benefits—it is illegal.49  The promotion of amateurism, or any other social 
goals, has no place in the equation and has no impact on the legality of a 
restraint.50 
Even if a social goal like amateurism were relevant to the analysis, the 
Rule of Reason is simply not equipped or designed to balance social welfare 
 
because the athletes are not paid—not because they do not have to pay the athletes millions of 
dollars, but because not paying the athletes makes their product popular.  See NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984) (“[T]he NCAA seeks to market a particular 
brand of football—college football.  The identification of this ‘product’ with an academic tradition 
differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than professional sports to which it 
might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball.  In order to preserve 
the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, 
and the like.”).  And if they paid anything more than a token fee, they would just be seen as an 
inferior (and cheap) minor league that would not be attractive to fans.  See id. at 117.  
 44.  See generally Mitten, supra note 41 (detailing the nuances of this issue and discussing how 
lower courts have approached it).   
 45.  See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (noting that balancing 
economic and non-economic effects is “beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence”). 
 46.  Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 47.  See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); Gabriel A. Feldman, 
The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 
561, 572 (2009). 
 48.   See Feldman, supra note 47, at 572. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See, e.g., Christian Dennie, White Out Full Grant-in-Aid: An Antitrust Action the NCAA 
Cannot Afford to Lose, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 97, 117 (2007). 
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with economic effects.51  Of course, there is general skepticism about the 
ability of judges to balance different competitive economic effects with any 
real accuracy or consistency.52  But these problems are amplified if courts 
are asked to balance economic effects with non-economic effects.53  How 
can we quantify a concept like the preservation of amateurism?54  How much 
weight should it be afforded compared to the economic harms caused by 
lack of compensation?  And before we even try to quantify the effect, how 
can we distinguish acceptable social goals like amateurism from 
unacceptable ones? 
If asking a court to balance the economic effects of a restraint is the 
equivalent of “judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular 
rock is heavy,”55 then asking a court to compare economic effects and social 
welfare is the equivalent of judging whether a particular line is longer than a 
particular joke is funny.  Incorporating a social goal into traditional antitrust 
analysis sets courts up for failure.  Not surprisingly, courts have largely 
failed, providing a wildly diverse and incoherent application of the Sherman 
Act to the NCAA’s student-athlete restrictions.56 
For example, one line of cases has held that the Sherman Act simply 
does not apply to NCAA rules regarding eligibility standards and 
amateurism.57  The Sixth Circuit gave the most recent exposition of this 
distinction in Bassett v. NCAA, where a college coach brought a Sherman 
 
 51.  See Phila Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 371.  
 52.  See Feldman, supra note 47, at 574–75. 
 53.  See Kreher, supra note 27, at 86. 
 54.  See id. (“Economic justifications have the advantage of at least being theoretically 
quantifiable.  When faced with a clear deadweight loss, how much should preserving amateurism . . . 
or furthering educational goals count?”).  
 55.  Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 56.  See generally, Lazaroff, supra note 17, at 329–30 (discussing the varied treatment of the 
NCAA under antitrust law).  In some cases, courts have found that the NCAA’s restrictions do not 
actually promote amateurism.  See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 116–19 
(1984) (holding that the NCAA’s limit on the number of college football games its member schools 
may televise was not justified on the basis of procompetitive effect); Law v. NCAA 134 F.3d 1010, 
1021–24 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the NCAA’s limit on coaches’ annual compensation was an 
unlawful restraint of trade under the Rule of Reason analysis).  In those cases, the antitrust analysis 
was simple because there were no real procompetitive benefits to offset the anticompetitive effects 
of the restraints.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 116–19; Law, 134 F.3d at 1021–24. 
 57.   See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text. 
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Act claim after he was terminated for violating NCAA recruiting rules.58  
The Sixth Circuit recognized that the NCAA engages in commercial activity 
that brings in significant revenue, but emphasized that the appropriate 
inquiry for purposes of the Sherman Act was “whether the rule itself is 
commercial, not whether the entity promulgating the rule is commercial.”59  
The court explained that the NCAA’s rules prevent coaches and athletes 
from violating the “spirit of amateur athletics by providing remuneration to 
athletes in exchange for their commitments to play for the violator’s football 
program” and from “harm[ing] the student-athlete academically when 
coaches and assistants complete coursework on behalf of the student-
athlete.”60  The Sixth Circuit then concluded that the NCAA’s rules 
preventing improper inducements of athletes in recruiting, like eligibility 
rules, “are all explicitly non-commercial.”61  The court even went so far as to 
deem such rules “anti-commercial and designed to promote and ensure 
competitiveness amongst NCAA member schools.”62  And enforcement of 
the rules, like the rules themselves, is a non-commercial activity outside the 
scope of the Sherman Act.63 
Similarly, in Jones v. NCAA, the court ruled that the Sherman Act did 
not reach the NCAA’s decision to declare a college hockey player ineligible 
because “[t]he proscriptions of the Act were ‘tailored for the business 
world,’ not as a mechanism for the resolution of controversies in the liberal 
arts or in the learned professions.”64  The student-athlete was “not a 
businessman in the traditional sense, and certainly not a ‘competitor’ within 
 
 58.  528 F.3d 426, 428 (6th Cir. 2008) . 
 59.  Id. at 433 (quoting Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 
(6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Notably, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
rule in question in Worldwide Basketball, the “Two in Four rule,” had “commercial impact insofar as 
it regulates games that constitute sources of revenue for both the member schools and the 
Promoters” and therefore was subject to scrutiny under the Sherman Act.  388 F.3d at 959.  
 60.  Bassett, 528 F.3d at 433. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 433–34. 
 64.  392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (citing E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 141 (1961)); see also Coll. Athletic Placement Serv. v. NCCA, No. 74-
1144, 1974 WL 998, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974) (holding that NCAA rule furthered a 
noncommercial objective and, therefore, did not fall under the coverage of the Sherman Act). 
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the contemplation of the antitrust laws.”65  The court added that the plaintiff 
had “not shown how the action of the N.C.A.A. in setting eligibility 
guidelines has any nexus to commercial or business activities in which the 
defendant might engage.”66 
In Gaines v. NCAA, the court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to 
the NCAA’s amateurism rules because “[e]ven in the increasingly 
commercial modern world, this Court believes there is still validity to the 
Athenian concept of a complete education derived from fostering full growth 
of both mind and body.”67  The court added that “[t]he overriding purpose 
behind the NCAA Rules at issue in this case is to preserve the unique 
atmosphere of competition between ‘student-athletes’” and thus rejected 
“the notion that such Rules may be judged or struck down by federal 
antitrust law.”68 
 The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Smith v. NCAA, 
holding that the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s eligibility 
requirements because they are “not related to the NCAA’s commercial or 
business activities.”69  Indeed, the court explained that “[r]ather than 
intending to provide the NCAA with a commercial advantage, the eligibility 
rules primarily seek to ensure fair competition in intercollegiate athletics.”70  
And in Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania held that NCAA rules regarding recruiting at summer 
camps are non-commercial and, therefore, not subject to scrutiny under the 
Sherman Act because the rules were “promulgated . . . in a paternalistic 
capacity to promote amateurism and education.” 71 
Recently, some courts have rejected the commercial/non-commercial 
distinction and held that the Sherman Act applies to all NCAA rules, 
including those designed to protect the amateur and academic aspects of 
 
 65.  Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 303. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). 
 70.  Id.  The court explained further that even if the Sherman Act did apply to the restraints in 
question, they were not anticompetitive.  Id. at 186. 
 71.  317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
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college sports.72  In Agnew v. NCAA, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
Sherman Act applies to all NCAA rules, remarking that “[n]o 
knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that big-time college football 
programs competing for highly sought-after high school football players do 
not anticipate economic gain from a successful recruiting program.”73  And, 
“[i]t follows that the NCAA’s bylaws can have an anticompetitive or a 
procompetitive effect on collegiate athletics generally and the national 
college football recruiting market specifically, and those effects can have an 
economic component.”74  Although acknowledging that the NCAA is not 
immune from antitrust law,75 these courts have avoided any substantive 
analysis of the law by concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove a relevant 
market.76 
The inevitable consequence of the anomalous antitrust deference 
 
 72.  See infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 73.  683 F.3d 328, 340 (7th Cir. 2012); see Smith, 139 F.3d at 187 (“We agree with these courts 
that, in general, the NCAA’s eligibility rules allow for the survival of the product, amateur sports, 
and allow for an even playing field.”); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(“The goal of the NCAA is to integrate athletics with academics.  Its requirements reasonably further 
this goal.”); Pocono, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 584 (“The evidence further shows that these justifications 
are in keeping with the NCAA principles of amateurism and recruiting that aim to promote 
education and keep student athletics separate from professional sports.”); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. 
Supp. 356, 378–79 (D. Ariz. 1983) (holding that the NCAA's sanctions had not violated antitrust law 
given that the sanctions reasonably related to the NCAA's goals of promoting fair competition and 
preservation of amateurism). 
 74.  Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341. 
 75.  See Lazaroff, supra note 17, at 343–44 (“[T]he common thread running through these 
decisions is that NCAA rules and regulations that have an obvious or demonstrable anticompetitive 
impact in legally cognizable relevant markets may be the subject of federal antitrust challenges.”). 
 76.  See, e.g., Agnew, 683 F.3d at 345 (“[W]e ultimately conclude that plaintiffs’ complaint did 
not sufficiently identify a commercial market—an obvious necessity for Sherman Act violations . . . 
.”); cf. Justin M. Hannan, Case Comment, Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012), 18 
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 345, 355 (2013) (“Student-athlete plaintiffs that . . . allege a 
relevant market have a strong chance to find themselves in unchartered territory: awaiting a 
procompetitive justification from the NCAA that falls outside those enumerated by Board of 
Regents.  Plaintiffs have struggled to satisfy the market-analysis phase under Sherman Act scrutiny, 
but Agnew acknowledged the existence of market presence and moved the discussion to 
procompetitive versus anticompetitive justifications for the bylaw, a state that few litigants have 
been able to reach.”).  But see Rock v. NCAA, No.1:12-CV-1019-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL 4479815, at 
*6–7 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013) (denying NCAA’s motion to dismiss as plaintiff identification of 
“the nationwide market for the labor of Division I football student athletes” was a plausible relevant 
market on its face).  
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afforded to the NCAA is a standardless body of law.  The only consistent 
theme underlying these cases is inconsistency.  The final section of this short 
piece thus offers a modest proposal to provide some shape and coherence to 
the application of antitrust law to the NCAA. 
IV.  A MODEST PROPOSAL 
The two-headed amateurism beast has left us with no workable 
framework for section 1 scrutiny of NCAA restraints on student-athletes.  
Instead, courts have created a hodgepodge of standards that are divorced 
from the basic purpose of antitrust law.  Absent an antitrust exemption, and 
assuming the continuing vitality of the amateurism defense, the goal of this 
short piece is modest—to suggest the adoption of a test that provides a 
coherent mechanism for setting limits on the ability of the NCAA to restrict 
competition for student-athletes. 
This proposal suggests that the solution may rest in using a means–ends 
analysis.  One simple option is to use the less restrictive alternative (LRA) 
inquiry adopted by then-Judge Taft in Addyston Pipe.77  I have criticized the 
LRA test in other contexts for its underlying inconsistency with the Rule of 
Reason, but the treatment of the NCAA is already completely inconsistent 
with antitrust law.78  This is not to suggest that two antitrust wrongs make a 
right, but the LRA inquiry can at least provide a systematic and predictable 
check on NCAA student-athlete restrictions. And if we are untying the 
NCAA from traditional antitrust law, it may be appropriate to untie the 
analysis from traditional antitrust law and create a more effective 
mechanism to govern the NCAA. 
The LRA test ensures that the benefits of an agreement could not have 
been achieved through a less restrictive alternative.79  This test relieves 
 
 77.  See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified, 
175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 78.  See generally Feldman, supra note 47. 
 79.  See Feldman, supra note 47, at 567–68 (discussing less restrictive alternative analysis as 
used in Addyston Pipe & Steel).  The test seeks to maximize Pareto-efficiency by ensuring that no 
alternative agreement could have achieved the same benefits without causing greater harm.  See 
generally id.  For a discussion on Pareto-efficieny, see Mark Pettit, Jr., Private Advantage and 
Public Power: Reexamining the Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Damages, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 417, 432–44 (1987). 
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courts of the burden of balancing the unbalanceable.80  That is, courts need 
not compare the gains to social welfare with the harm to competition.  
Instead, it only requires courts to confirm that the NCAA has used the least 
anticompetitive means to achieve its social benefit ends.81  In that sense, it 
only requires a court to measure the social benefits of the restraint versus the 
social benefits of its alternatives and the anticompetitive impact of the 
restraint versus the anticompetitive impact of its alternatives.  Granted, this 
is no easy task, but it at least provides a mechanism for courts to consider 
both social and economic effects. 
This proposed use of the LRA inquiry is also consistent with the 
antitrust analysis of restraints in the professional sports industry.82  Under 
this analysis, courts look to see if the restraint in question achieves 
procompetitive benefits.83  In the context of professional sports, these 
procompetitive benefits are typically the promotion or maintenance of 
competitive balance.84  If the restraint does not achieve any procompetitive 
benefits it is a “naked” restraint and is illegal.85  If it does achieve 
procompetitive benefits, the court looks to see if the restraint is reasonably 
necessary for achieving those procompetitive benefits.86  If the restraint is 
not reasonably necessary—that is, if there are less restrictive alternatives 
available to achieve those benefits—it is illegal.87  If it is reasonably 
 
 80.  See Feldman, supra note 47, at 628–29 (discussing proper role of LRA analysis as helping 
courts interpret and predict the procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive effects of a restraint.) 
 81.  Although this would not completely eliminate balancing from the equation, it would at least 
allow courts to avoid comparing social and economic effects.  See Gabriel Feldman, Antitrust Versus 
Labor Law in Professional Sports: Balancing the Scales After Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1300 (2012) [hereinafter Balancing the Scales]. 
 82.  See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(applying LRA inquiry). 
 83.  See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102–03 (1984). 
 84.  See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra & T. Joel Zuercher, Striking Out “Competitive Balance” in Sports, 
Antitrust, and Intellectual Property, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1499, 1500 (2006) (“‘Competitive 
balance’ has been a focus of sports antitrust cases for three decades . . . .”). 
 85.  See, e.g., Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674–77 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(invoking the notion of a “naked” restraint in the context of a disputed NBA television plan and 
affirming a lower court’s finding that such plan constituted an illegal restraint that lacked a sufficient 
procompetitive justification).  
 86.  See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (detailing 
the nuances of this analysis). 
 87.  See Feldman, supra note 47, at 567–68. 
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necessary, it is legal.88  In other words, the key question in many 
professional sports player restraint antitrust cases is simply whether the 
restraint is reasonably necessary for achieving competitive balance.89  
Alternatively, courts can look for guidance from proportionality analysis 
(PA).  PA has been adopted by virtually every judicial system in the world 
except the United States and offers another potential starting point for a 
specialized form of antitrust analysis for the NCAA.90  PA operates in two 
stages.91  The first stage is a means–ends analysis that is essentially the same 
as the LRA inquiry.92  The second stage incorporates a traditional balancing 
test that compares competing values and objectives.93  This stage requires 
that “the intensity of interference with one principle must be proportional to 
the extent of satisfaction of another.”94 
Although this balancing stage may present difficulties similar to those 
inherent in the Rule of Reason balancing test, PA embeds a sliding scale that 
permits courts to exercise a level of discretion, or “margin of appreciation,” 
depending on the interests implicated by the restraint in question.95  The 
sliding scale of deference permits a nuanced, context-sensitive analysis that 
may allow courts to better handle the NCAA’s anomalous amateurism 
defense.96 
These are imperfect suggestions, but stricter adoption of a means–ends 
inquiry may provide some needed direction to the rudderless ship of NCAA 
antitrust analysis. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The NCAA continues to serve as intellectual kryptonite for antitrust 
 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See, e.g., Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d in part and 
vacated in part on other grounds, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 90.  Balancing the Scales, supra note 81, at 1295–1300 (2012). 
 91.  Id. at 1296; see Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Discretion in International and European 
Law, in TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 107, 114 (Nicholas Tsagourias ed., 2007). 
 92.  Balancing the Scales, supra note 81, at 1295–96. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Rivers, supra note 91, at 115. 
 95.  Balancing the Scales, supra note 81, at 1297–98. 
 96.  Id. at 1298–99. 
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jurisprudence.  Absent a principled method for applying the Sherman Act to 
the NCAA’s vast array of rules, courts have struggled with ad hoc and 
inconsistent rulings that have further muddied the antitrust waters.  This 
short piece does not offer a comprehensive solution for taming the NCAA 
antitrust beast, but provides a starting point for rethinking the antitrust 
approach to amateurism. 
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